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Political Resolutions in the 
International Labor Organizations 
the expérience since 1964 
David Tajgman 
This paper examines the difficulty in defining a "political 
resolution"; it analyzes the increased use of political resolutions 
in the ILO, and discusses various attempts made to restrain their 
use and minimize their disruptive influence. 
The resolution1 has traditionally been used as an instrument for expres-
sing a consensus of opinion in the International Labor Organization (ILO). 
In récent years, however, resolutions hâve been used increasingly to pro-
mote partisan political views in the Organization. This use of political reso-
lutions is symptomatic of power shifts in the composition of the Organiza-
tion; they are but one élément of increasing politicalization of the ILO. This 
paper will examine the difficulty in defining a "political" resolution, ana-
lyze the increased use of political resolutions in the ILO, and discuss various 
attempts made to restrain their use and minimize their disruptive influence2. 
THE PROBLEM: POLITICIZATION 
The ILO is a specialized agency within the United Nations family char-
ged with the improvement of working conditions throughout the world. 
Founded in 1919, the Organization convenes an annual International Labor 
Conférence to draft international labor standards, authorize technical assis-
* TAJGMAN, David, Hastings Collège of the Law, University of California. 
*• The author wishes to acknowledge Professor John P. Windmuller for the invaluable 
insight he provided throughout the development of this paper. 
1 The "resolutions" and resolution procédure referred to throughout this paper is that 
described in Article 17 of the Standing Orders of the International Labor Organization. Article 
17 provides that delegates to the annual International Labor Conférence may submit resolu-
tions not related to topics already on the Conférence agenda to the Director-General of the 
Organization for considération by the Conférence. 
2 Torsten LANDELIUS discussed the problem of political resolutions in his Workers, 
Employers, and Governments: A Comparative Study of Délégations and Groups at the Inter-
national Labor Conférence, 1919-1964, Stockholm, AB P.A. Norstedt and Sonen, 1965. His 
text is now outdated, however, it shall be referred to several times in this paper. 
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tance programs, and give gênerai guidance to the educational and research 
efforts of its secrétariat, the International Labor Office. The Organization 
is constitutionally mandated to perform a range of specialized functions to 
improve the lot of wage and salary earners. Because much of this work re-
quires coopération among governments, employer s, and workers, a tripar-
tite System of représentation is used, bringing together delegates represen-
ting thèse often conflicting views. This system is unique among UN agencies 
as it combines the partisan interests of private voluntary organizations3 as 
well as the international interests of the national polity4. 
The "functionalist"5 theory of the workings of international organiza-
tions contends that nation-states seek supranational organization in order 
to realize objectives which are common to ail yet involve complex problems 
whose amélioration requires coopération across national boundaries. Be-
cause the issues dealt with by the organization are circumscribed by its 
members, the international coopérative effort ought to trensend the scope 
of national politics. While each nation-state is influenced by domestic and 
international political pressures, a commitment to international objectives 
minimizes conflict in the international organization. For example, members 
of the ILO hâve agreed to support the économie development of lesser de-
veloped countries through the International Labor Office. While the spirit 
of international coopération exists for this goal and a plan of action may ul-
timately be agreed upon, delegates will nonetheless debate spécifie aid pro-
grams according to pressures generated by partisan objectives. 
Politicization of specialized international organizations occurs when 
the functional processes of the organization, the ILO resolutions procédure, 
for example, are used for purposes outside of the organization's specialized 
compétence6. The resuit is a distortion of the process in question and con-
troversy in the specialized international forum. Hence, when the subject 
matter of resolutions in the ILO turns away from labor standards, technical 
assistance, research, or other programs and topics which members deem to 
be within the Organization's supranational compétence, then the resolution 
seeks to realize national rather than the ILO's specialized international ob-
jectives. Similarly, blocs of like-minded nations may ally to accomplish 
3 Labor unions and employer, trade associations. 
4 For a full discussion of the workings of the ILO, see G. A. JOHNSTON, The Interna-
tional Labour Organization: Its Work For Social and Economie Progress, Lonclon, Europa 
Publications, 1970. 
5 MITRANY, David, A Working Peace System, Chicago, 1966, for a full explanation 
of the functionalist view of specialized organizations. 
6 LYONS, Gène M., David A. BALDWIN, and Donald W. McNEMAR, "The 'Politi-
cization' Issue in the UN Specialized Agencies", in The Changing United Nations: Options For 
The United States, David A. Kay, éd., New York, The Academy of Political Science, 1977, p. 
81. 
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their own partisan objectives. As a resuit, controversies arise regarding the 
propriety of the resolution. Thèse controversies absorb the time and atten-
tion of the Organization, eventually having a detrimental effect on the exé-
cution of the Organization's tasks. 
The concept of a specialized, mission-oriented, international organiza-
tion implies that members of the organization recognize its limited jurisdic-
tion and authority. Essentially, the création of specialized organization re-
quires that issues beyond an organization's jurisdiction be reserved for 
other specialized agencies or the political organizations of the UN family. 
Member states may, of course, attempt to modify the organization's juris-
diction through constitutional processes7. However, until the jurisdiction is 
reexamined and altered, the introduction of issues outside the constitution-
ally recognized confines of the organization will tend to hâve a divisive im-
pact. Such is the case with political resolutions in the ILO. 
Définition of a Political Resolution 
Political resolutions hâve existed in the ILO throughout its history8. It 
has not been until recently, however, that such resolutions hâve had a sig-
nificant impact on the workings of the Organization. As Western hegemony 
in the Organization has diminished, the potential for differing views of the 
propriety of particular resolutions has increased. Since 19649 power in the 
ILO has shifted so drastically that resolutions of a political nature hâve 
sometimes become disruptive of the International Labor Conférence. This 
disruption results from the conflict between the broad interprétation of the 
ILO's jurisdiction held by Eastern European and Third World nations and 
the more narrow interprétation applied by the "old guard", the industrial-
ized market economy nations10 of the West. 
7 For an analysis of Soviet motivations for joining the Organization see Ernst B. 
HAAS, Beyond The Nation-State, Functionalism and International Organization, Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 1964, pp. 228-233. 
8 For examples of political resolutions between 1950 and 1964, see International Labor 
Conférence Proceedings from the following years at the page indicated: 1950: 415, 1950: 416, 
1951: 520, 1951: 522, 1952: 452, 1955: 537, 1955: 541, 1956: 594, 1957: 605, 1958: 215, 1960: 
578, 1960: 595, 1961: 681, 1961: 682, 1961: 683, 1962: 624, 1962: 633. 
9 The year 1964 is not selected arbitrarily. In 1963, the Group of 77 was officially form-
ed as an interest bloc in United Nations Organizations; the last amendment of the resolutions 
procédure was made in June 1963; LANDELIUS concludes his study of the ILO, including 
comments regarding the resolution procédure, after the 1964 Labor Conférence; in 1964 of-
ficiai discussions concerning structural reform of the Organization began; and the last exercise 
of preliminary control over political resolutions occurred at the 1963 Conférence. In thèse ways 
1964 marked a turning point for the Organization and an idéal starting point for this paper. 
10 Henceforth, " IMEC", industrialized market economy country. 
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It is difficult to define political resolutions objectively. It is possible, 
however, to develop and apply certain criteria upon which a détermination 
may be made. Three such criteria are used hère. 
Political resolutions often inspire conflict among the Organization's 
members. Controversy may develop over the interprétation of a constitu-
tionally established jurisdictional norm. The degree to which a resolution is 
controversial may define the degree to which its concern represents the po-
litical motives of a particular nation or multi-national bloc rather than the 
concerns of the Organization. This élément of "controversialness" must be 
distinguished from the conflict that normally arises between the interests of 
the tripartite groups. 
A second clue to politicization can be found in the sources of support 
and résistance given to resolutions. The involvement of various constituent 
groups in a resolution's sponsorship, debate, and vote may help define the 
source of controversy which arises over its adoption. In discussing whether 
a particular resolution is political, we may refer to the support or résistance 
given to that resolution by political interest groups such as Western or East-
ern blocs, and the Group of 77, as well as the traditional économie interest 
groups recognized in the ILO's formai composition — employer, worker, 
and government représentatives. For example, a resolution sponsored by 
the employer, worker, and government représentatives from Hungary, 
Czechslovakia, and the Ukrainian SSR concerning the reconversion of the 
armaments industry with a view to ensuring world peace and safeguarding 
the employment of workers affected, may well reflect the désire of the Com-
munist bloc to hâve the ILO take a position on disarmament. 
Several gênerai propositions may be made about sponsorship, voting 
patterns, and debate: 
1. Worker delegates hâve always sponsored a large majority of the resolu-
tions brought before the Conférence because they are "challenging" 
party within the tripartite System of the ILO. 
2. Resolutions with wide support across political and économie interest 
group boundaries are often non-political resolutions as they represent 
the aspirations of delegates from varying political persuasions. 
3. Sponsorship along géographie or political boundaries may be more in-
dicative of a political resolution than sponsorship along the tripartite 
économie interest group Unes. 
4. Voting records showing bloc voting on spécifie resolutions may, to the 
degree they can be reconstructed, be indicative of a clash of political in-
terest. 
POLITICAL RESOLUTIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION: 503 
Lastly, politicization may be determined by the content and language 
of the resolution itself. Although this third criterion is the most subjective, 
four catégories of resolutions may be distinguished in helping to make a 
reasonable assessment of a resolution's political nature. 
The first category includes resolutions concerning current or proposed 
programs and activities of the ILO or international labor standards set by 
the Organization. Thèse may be termed functional resolutions. While it is 
possible that some of thèse resolutions are proposed for political reasons, 
their resuit, nonetheless, reflects the mission of the Organization. 
A second category includes resolutions promoting a particular course 
of action or concerning a topic clearly outside of the ILO's franchise as set 
forth in the Organization's Constitution. Although sponsors of thèse non-
germane resolutions may hâve motivations that are congruent with the 
ILO's goals, the fact that thèse topics are outside of the ILO's responsibili-
ties makes them disruptive of the Organization*s functions. Thèse may be 
considered political resolutions because they cause conflict within the Or-
ganization by opening discussion on topics upon which member states hâve 
not given the Organization authority to act. 
The third category includes resolutions calling for or implying the con-
demnation of a government for the violation of standards or ideals allegedly 
within the ILO franchise. The opportunity for political pronouncement is 
inhérent in thèse condemnatory resolutions. Because the condemnation may 
address an issue within the jurisdiction of the ILO, the content and histori-
cal context of the measure must be carefully examined in order to détermine 
its intent. An example of the difficulty posed by this type of resolution will 
be discussed latter. 
The fourth category of resolutions includes those concerning the struc-
ture and organization of the ILO. Over récent years an impetus has devel-
oped to restructure the ILO to accomodate it to a changing international 
order. Political motivations may be involved in thèse structural resolutions. 
In fact, the topic of structural reform has divided the Organization for more 
than 20 years11. 
By analyzing a resolution in terms of three criteria — controversy, Unes 
of support and résistance, and content — a détermination may be made as 
to whether a resolution serves the interest of partisan political blocs in the 
ILO or the Constitutionally established objectives of the Organization12. 
11 See Note 36, infra. 
12 For similar use of "political content and controversy" as criteria for distinguishing 
between "political issues" and "trade union issues" brought before the ILO's Committee on 
Freedom of Association, see HAAS, op. cit., p. 388. 
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Trends in the Use of the Resolutions Procédure Since 1964 
Since 1964 the resolution as an instrument of organizational consensus 
has undergone dramatic change in quantitative as well as qualitative terms. 
The resolutions hâve been used with greater frequency and success to pursue 
the interests of individual nations and multi-national groups — to the dis-
regard of issues which the Organization was originally formed to address. 
In this sensé, adopted resolutions serve as an index of majority concerns 
within the Organization, while draft resolutions13 serve as an index of con-
cerns among the various constituent groups of the Organization. The 
changing orientation of the ILO is shown by the success of political resolu-
tions during various periods in récent years. This success is evidenced by the 
increased visibility of political resolutions in the debate of the Organization 
and the greater likelihood of their adoption at the annual International 
Labor Conférence. For this reason, the analysis presented hère focuses on 
the resolutions submitted and adopted over the years. 
Table A indicates that the number of functional resolutions adopted by 
the plenary, as well as the total number of resolutions adopted, has general-
ly fallen since 1964. This can be attributed to the time taken up by the in-
creasingly controversial quality of some resolutions submitted to the annual 
Conférence. 
For example, in 1969, only one resolution was adopted by the Con-
férence; it empowered the Office to examine the labor and trade union situ-
ation in Spain. In 1973, no resolutions were adopted by the plenary; one 
resolution regarding the condemnation of Israeli authorities for various 
labor policies was, however, vigorously debated. Although the resolution 
was not adopted, the controversy it created took up so much time in the 
Resolutions Committee and plenary that the Conférence was unable to take 
up other resolutions. In 1975, the first resolution to be considered by the 
plenary condemned labor policies in Chile. Controversy over this resolution 
in Committee foreclosed considération of ail resolutions in the plenary that 
year. And in 1980, debate in the Resolutions Committee over the resolution 
condemning Israeli settlement policies lasted nine of the fourteen days allo-
cated for the Committee's work14. Thèse four years attest to the impact con-
13 Draft resolutions are those resolutions submitted for Conférence review but not 
adopted. 
14 International Labour Organization, Proceedings of the 1980 International Labour 
Conférence, Geneva, ILO, 1980, Provisional Record 43, p. 2. Henceforth référence to Confér-
ence proceedings prior to 1977 will be noted for example, as CP 1971:8 (Conférence proceed-
ings, year, page). Subséquent to 1977, the Record of Proceedings of the International Labour 
Conférence contains a Provisional Record of the Conférence Proceedings (PR); a list of cor-
rigenda to the Provisional Record; and the authentic texts of Conventions and Recommenda-
tions and the resolutions adopted by the Conférence. See p. III of Record of Proceedings, 
Geneva, ILO, 1978. Henceforth, the Record of Conférences after 1977 will be cited as CP/PR 
1980, 43:2 (Conférence Proceedings, Provisional Record, year, number, page). 
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troversial resolutions hâve on the conduct of Conférence Proceedings: po-
litical resolutions may create a roadblock to considération and adoption of 
functional resolutions. 
It becomes évident, however, when comparing various years in Tables 
A and B that the mère bulk of non-germane, condemnatory, and structural 
resolutions submitted to the Conférence does not necessarily preclude con-
sidération of functional resolutions. In 1970, five functional resolutions 
were adopted. Despite the adoption of one Western sponsored condem-
natory resolution in 1971, three functional resolutions were adopted in that 
year. And in 1972, four functional resolutions were adopted in addition to 
one resolution, sponsored jointly by Western and Eastern delegates con-
demning Portugal for trade union policies in colonial territories. 
Apparently it is a combination of factors in the international political 
environment, e.g. relations between East and West, North and South, 
forthcoming décisions regarding various international relations, récent de-
velopments between allied nations, etc., that will détermine first, whether a 
controversy will develop over the language of a resolution and, second, 
whether the conflict is disruptive enough to resuit in the blockage of other 
work in the plenary. 
It is interesting to note in Table B the quantities of resolutions submit-
ted in each of thèse four catégories. Functional resolutions are most fre-
quently submitted, followed by condemnatory, structural, and non-
germane. Table A shows that functional resolutions make up the majority 
of resolutions adopted by the Conférence followed by condemnatory, non-
germane and structural resolutions. 
While the West has matched Eastern European and Third World spon-
sorship of condemnatory resolution, the West has consistently out-stripped 
Eastern European and Third World contributions in the functional catego-
ry. This may be a resuit of Western attempts over the years to demonstrate 
the "proper" sort of resolution that ought to be sponsored by délégations 
tothelLO1 5 . 
The condemnatory resolution poses particular problems because they 
provide the opportunity for member states to score political points by level-
ling embarrassing charges against other states for infractions which appear 
to fall within the ILO jurisdiction. The degree to which charges are justi-
15 Note the U.S. government's sole sponsorship of the 1980 resolution concerning 
Zimbabwe. Conférence debate was highly lauditory of this resolution; its "pure" nature seems 
a striking example of that country's attempts to show the "proper" resolutions for the Confér-
ence. It is interesting that American interests hâve been served by Zimbabwian stability and 
that the United States has begun a substantial aid program with the new African nation. 
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fied, the historical context of the resolution, and the manner in which the 
condemnation is made must be considered, in addition to the three other 
criteria outlined above, in determining if the particular resolution is, infact, 
politically motivated. The potential conflict and disruption engendered in 
the condemnatory resolution, as illustrated below, warrants spécial con-
sidération. 
Condemnatory Resolutions: The Anti-Israël Resolutions 
In 1971 the worker delegates from the Syrian Arab Republic and 
Mauritania submitted a resolution to the Conférence concerning "the poli-
cy of discrimination and violation of freedom of association practised by 
Israël in occupied territories."16 The resolution was priority ranked17 by the 
Resolutions Committee tenth out of sixteen resolutions and was not con-
sidered outside the Committee. In 1973 a substantially similar resolution 
was submitted, this time sponsored by the worker delegates from the Syrian 
Arab Republic and the Libyan Arab Republic, as well as by the employer 
delegate from Iraq. The 1973 resolution was ranked first out of 21 resolu-
tion. In the plenary, however, the resolution died for lack of a quorum. The 
resolution was resubmitted for a third time in 1974. Ranked first out of fif-
teen resolutions, the resolution was finally adopted by the Conférence. 
The anti-Israël resolution is illustrative of the most disruptive sort of 
resolution. The resolution was extremely divisive, although it concerned an 
issue which appeared within the jurisdiction of the Organization. The lan-
guage and historical context18 of the resolution, as well as the limited and 
obviously partisan nature of its sponsorship, raised cries of politicization. 
While each successive submission of the resolution mustered greater degrees 
of support, each submission of the resolution resulted in greater disruption 
of the Conférence. For example, in 1971 the resolution was not dealt with in 
the plenary because of its low priority ranking. In 1973, dispute over the 
propriety of the resolution caused cancellation of one sitting of the plenary 
and foreclosed considération of other resolutions. In 1974, the resolution 
was acted upon swiftly and decisively albeit over protest from various Wes-
16 CP 1971:8. 
17 As will be discussed later in this paper, Article 17(5) of the Standing Orders of the 
Conférence requires that the Resolutions Committee of the Conférence détermine the priority 
of resolutions to be brought before the plenary. The first five rankings are determined by Com-
mittee vote, the remaining resolutions are given a priority ranking by a Working Party of the 
Committee. 
18 Middle East peace negotiations were underway in Geneva during this period. 
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tern délégations19. However, the adoption contributed to the list of griev-
ances which ultimately led to the withdrawal of the United States from the 
ILO. 
The language of the resolution as it developed between 1971 and 1974 
shows the authors' intention of making a political pronouncement against 
the Israeli government. The 1971 text referred to "the policy of discrimina-
tion and violation of freedom of association practised by Israël in occupied 
territories." This contrasts sharply with the 1973 and 1974 texts which 
avoided récognition of the Israeli state by referring, in 1973, to "the policy 
of discrimination, racism, and violation of trade union freedoms practised 
by the Israeli authorities in Palestine and the occupied territories" and, in 
1974, to "the policy of discrimination, racism and violation of trade union 
freedoms and rights practised by the Israeli authorities in Palestine and in 
the other occupied Arab Territories." 
Another difficulty with the resolution was its disregard for established 
ILO procédure. Although the texts of the 1971, 1973, and 1974 resolutions 
called for an Office investigation, they condemned the Israeli authorities 
before an actual investigation had been made. 
Following the adoption of the resolution in 1974, an ILO mission was 
sent to the occupied territories. After investigating the situation in the area, 
the mission issued a report of which was generally favorable to Israeli poli-
cies. Despite the outcome of the Office investigation, a resolution was sub-
mitted at the 1978 Conférence concerning the implementation of the 1974 
resolution, asking that the Director-General implement the 1974 resolution 
in light of the provision of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilians in Times of War20. The 1978 resolution was not adopted 
for lack of a quorum. Discussion in the plenary following the vote indicates 
that a degree of backroom persuasion by Western groups may hâve influ-
enced the outcome of the vote21. This may very well hâve been related to the 
fact that the United States withdrew from the Organization in November 
1977. In fact, some believe that the 1978 vote resulted from the efforts of 
Western délégations to show the United States that progress had been made 
in de-politicizing the ILO in the seven months since their withdrawal from 
the Organization. There is no certain way of determining whether this par-
19 In fact, a group of worker's members proposée! an amendment to the resolution that 
would hâve "replaced the title and text of the resolution, (yet) dealt with exactly the same sub-
ject." The amendment was found irreceivable by the Resolutions Committee after "the Chair-
man and the Committee voted not to hear the opinion of the Légal Advisor" in regard to the 
legality of such an amendment. (CP 1974:414-417). See CP 1974:414-429 for discussion of the 
resolution. 
20 CP/PR 1978, 1:13. 
21 CP/PR 1978, 35:13-14. 
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ticular vote influenced the United States' décision to return to the Organiza-
tion in 1980. It is certain that political resolutions were less successful and 
visible at the 1978 and 1979 Conférences then they had been in the early 
1970's. 
However, another anti-Israël resolution, concerning Israeli settlements 
in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories, was submitted at the 1980 
Conférence22. The resolution was ranked first by the Resolutions Commit-
tee23 and, after several amendments24, was adopted in the plenary25. Several 
aspects of this resolution and its adoption are notable. 
First, the resolution's original language was significantly amended in 
committee in an effort to rernove it from the category of resolutions which 
blatantly condemn a member state before Office investigation. Hence, ré-
férence to "United Nations resolutions condemning the Israeli settle-
ments"26 was eliminated, a clause merely recognizing the existence of the 
U.N. resolutions, citing its language Verbatim was substituted27; référence 
to the existence of an "Israelisation policy"28 was omitted and replaced29; 
active language "(c)ondemning the establishment of Israeli settlements in 
Palestine and other occupied Arab territories,"30 was replaced with " (ex-
pressions of) concern at the establishment of Israeli settlements in Palestine 
and the occupied Arab territories."31 Thèse efforts to "water down" the 
condemnation may be viewed either as capitulation by groups which would 
hâve blocked the resolution in the past, or as a realistic attempt by those 
same groups to make more constitutionally acceptable resolutions whose 
adoption seems assured. This author believes the latter is the more accurate 
view. 
Secondly, the resolution was adopted by secret ballot. Mr. Oechslin, 
chairman of the employers' group and delegate from France, motioned for 
a secret ballot on the question, ostensibly to protect freedom of expres-
22 CP/PR 1980, 1:1. 
23 CP/PR 1980, 39:1. 
24 C P / P R 1980, 39:13-14. 
25 CP/PR 1980, 43:30. 
26 CP/PR 1980, 1:2. 
27 CP/PR 1980, 39:30. 
28 CP/PR 1980, 1:230. 
29 C P / P R 1980, 39:30. 
30 CP/PR 1980, 1:2. 
3i CP/PR 1980, 39:31. 
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sion32. Mr. Morris, workers' delegate from Canada, seconded the motion33. 
The proposai has great significance beyond its being the first time a pro-
posai for a secret ballot has been made at an International Labor Con-
férence34. Knowing that ail other avenues of blocking the resolution were 
closed, Western groups, traditionally opposed to anti-Israeli resolutions, at-
tempted to use the anonymity of a secret ballot to defeat the resolution. In 
fact, the effort was almost successful: the final vote, requiring a quorum of 
257 votes, was 249 votes in favor, 15 votes against, with 156 abstentions35. 
Seven additional abstention votes would hâve prevented a quorum and 
defeated the resolution's adoption36. 
Condemnations of Spain, South Africa, and Chile 
One observes in Table B a significant number of condemnatory resolu-
tions sponsored by Western délégations. Three of the eight condemnatory 
resolutions adopted by the Conférences between 1974 and 1980 were spon-
sored by worker members of Western délégations. As a means of compari-
son with the political, anti-Israeli resolution it is useful to examine the con-
tent of thèse three resolutions. 
The 1969 resolution condemning Spain was sponsored by workers' 
délégations of seven Western European countries37. The resolution was 
composed of a preamble and three one-sentence paragraphs. The Confér-
ence was asked to note that an intérim report had been made by a study 
group on the situation in Spain, that the report had been communicated to 
the Conférence, and that the Governing Body should consider the report. 
This resolution condemning Spain was sponsored by workers, phrased in 
language which respects the investigatory procédures of the Organization, 
concisely stating the facts and presenting the Organization's position re-
garding further action. The resolution met with no opposition in the ple-
nary38. 
32 CP/PR 1980, 43:24. The vote was in accordance with Article 19, Paragraph 11 of the 
Standing Orders. Part of Article 19 reads "(v)otes by secret ballot shall be counted by the 
Secrétariat under the direction of three returning officers, nominated respectively by the 
Government, Employers' and Workers' groups." In an attempt to infuse political interest 
groups into the Organization's formai récognition of tripartite interest groups, Mr. El Fattal, 
Government delegate of the Syrian Arab Republic, asked that "in order to observe justice and 
neutrality and objectivity... the Chairman of the Group of 77 should be one of the returning 
officers for the vote by secret ballot." The request was denied. See CP/PR 1980, 43:26. 
33 CP/PR 1980, 43:25. 
34 CP/PR 1980, 43:26. 
35 CP/PR 1980, 43:30. 
36 See note 43 , infra. 
37 Fédéral Republic of Germany, Austr ia , United Kingdom, Belgium, France , Norway, 
Denmark . 
38 C P 1969:465, 538. 
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The following year, 1970, the government delegate from Spain was the 
sole sponsor of a resolution concerning the right of reply of représentatives 
of member states attending sessions of the Governing Body as observers39. 
The resolution complained that the Governing Body did not yield to ob-
servers the right to speak " . . . even when their country is directly criticized." 
This 1970 resolution was ranked eleventh out of twelve and was not con-
sidered by the Committee40. This draft resolution was no doubt in response 
to the previous year's condemnation. 
The 1971 resolution condemning South Africa set out to generally 
"condemn the continued suppression of fundamental human and trade 
union rights in several countries."41 South Africa was used as the sole exam-
ple of a nation practising apartheid policies. Interestingly, no active clauses 
refered to South Africa, only the preamble of the resolution condemns 
South African policies. Authority for the condemnation is taken from anti-
apartheid resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Coun-
cil, and other United Nations bodies42. The resolution could hâve addressed 
itself to the issue of apartheid without the illustrative mention of South 
Africa. This fact leads to a conclusion that interest group politics motivated 
the resolution, despite its seemingly humanitarian focus. This resolution 
shows that, on occasion, worker delegates of the Western Bloc hâve used 
the resolution procédure for political purposes43. 
The 1974 resolution condemning Chile is most pertinent in our quest to 
clearly define political resolutions. This resolution had plural roots: three 
separate resolutions were originally submitted to the Conférence,, one spon-
sored by a group of Eastern European workers, one by the worker delegates 
39 C P 1970:19. 
40 CP 1970:600. Parenthetically, in 1971 the Spanish Government delegate sponsored, 
without co-sponsors, four functional resolutions. They concerned action of the ILO to pro-
mote économie and social progress in agriculture in developing countries; social policy re-
quired by geographical mobility of workers; employment protection and safeguards for under-
privileged workers; and hours of work and rest period of aircraft crews. The fact that the 
Spanish government délégation to the ILO sponsored so many functional resolutions in 1971, 
just two years after a condemnation of Spanish labor policies and one year after an attempt at 
rule making through resolution, leads one to consider whether thèse resolutions were not aimed 
at showing that the Spanish government still aspired to the true spirit of the ILO. 
41 CP 1971:809. 
42 C P 1971:808, pa ragraph 8 of the resolution. 
43 The resolution was sponsored by a contingent of Western worker delegates from 
Sweden, Belgium, Japan, France, Canada, the Fédéral Republic of Germany, the United King-
dom, and Norway. 
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from Belgium, and one by a group of Western European workers44. Thèse 
three texts were ultimately combined into one45. Each of the three proposed 
resolutions had a certain degree of political rhetoric: the Eastern version 
was outstanding in this way, the Belgian submission ran a close second, with 
the Western version a distant third. The Western text avoided inflammatory 
language, citing the repulsion of an ILO Fact-Finding and Conciliation 
Commission on Freedom of Association by Chilean authorities as justifica-
tion for (1) calling upon the Chilean authorities to cease violation of human 
and trade union rights and (2) excluding Chile from participation in ILO 
technical coopération activities and operational programs pending the visit 
and report of the Commission46. Both the Belgian and the Eastern Euro-
pean resolutions cite particular, often documented, cases of infractions by 
Chilean authorities; the Belgian text then asks that the procédure governing 
the Commission be amended to enable it to carry out its mission outside of 
the country, while the Eastern version goes no further than imposing sanc-
tions similar to the Western text. 
While there are differing degrees of hyperbole in each of the resolu-
tions the consensus of opinion remained that an investigation of the Chilean 
situation was necessary. The sovereignty of the Chilean state was not ques-
tioned, nor did the resolution mention outright "the continued violation... 
of human rights..." as compared with the anti-Israeli resolution of the same 
year. The anti-Israël and Chilean resolutions also differ in that the former 
was broadly phrased citing no spécifie infraction by authorities, while the 
later, in its final form, cited spécifie, documented action taken by authori-
ties to limit human rights. Thèse différences are significant: they support 
the proposition that différent condemnatory resolutions can be distinguish-
ed as more or less political by an observation of the groups within the Con-
férence supporting and resisting the resolution and an analysis of the lan-
guage of the resolution and its implications. This analysis may be applied, 
with varying degrees of certainty, to détermine whether other types of reso-
lutions are politieized. 
44 Respectively, the sponsors were from Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, 
German Démocratie Republic, Byelorussian SSR, USSR, Ukrainian SSR, and Hungary; 
Belgium; Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Mexico, Norway, and Denmark. 
SeeCP 1974:10-11, 14-16. 
45 C P 1974:808-809. 
46 C P 1974:15-16. 
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CONTROLS AND RESTRAINTS 
If it is accepted that political resolutions deter the ILO from its mis-
sion, then the issue is whether preliminary control should be exercised over 
resolutions in order to sift the functional resolutions from the political. 
The desirability of compromising totally free and unrestrained use of 
resolutions by imposing preliminary control upon resolutions has been 
debated before the International Labor Conférence on several occasions. 
The points of contention hâve been limits on the control power, where and 
when such power should be exercised, and in whom authority for with-
holding resolutions should be placed. As a resuit of this ongoing debate, 
procédures and practices hâve evolved in the Organization for the purpose 
of suppressing the submission of political resolutions and minimizing the 
disruption they cause. 
This section shall discuss the development and exercise of rules for the 
preliminary control of political resolutions. The final section shall discuss 
the most récent attempts — from 1964 to the présent — at expanding the 
degree of preliminary control exercised over political resolutions. 
Control Through Established Rules 
Several procédures embodied in Article 17 of the Standing Orders, the 
rules regulating the opération of the Organization and Conférence, are aim-
ed at challenging the submission of political resolutions. It is not the pur-
pose of this paper to discuss the évolution of the resolutions procédure prior 
to its latest amendment in 1963. However, in explaining deficiencies in thèse 
provisions an exposition of various attempts to establish and exercise parlia-
mentary control would be useful. 
One trend is abundantly clear: the orientation of majority power in the 
Organization has slowly changed, resulting in both the évolution of prelimi-
nary control procédures and their fall into disuse. In more précise terms, the 
industrialized West dominated the resolution of preliminary control rules 
and in the exercise of those rules47. As the balance of power in the Organiza-
47 HAAS, op. cit., pp. 139-168, outlines the ideology of the ILO from 1919-1948. In 
thèse pages, HAAS posits that the ILO was a création of Western industrialized market econo-
my countries aimed at "defusing" radical labor movements by taking concerted action to im-
prove the conditions of working life and the working people. Today control of the ILO re-
mains important to Western capitalist countries, if not solely for historic continuity and to 
avoid capitulation to Socialist bloc and Third World demands, but also to continue this "tradi-
tional" work of the Organization. Over the years the West has used its dominance to promul-
gate rules to reinforce their hegemony in the face of changing power relationships in the inter-
national domain. 
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tion began to shift, existing preliminary controls fell by the wayside. Today, 
it appears increasingly unlikely that an effective procédural amendment can 
be agreed upon. Rulemaking does not appear to be the means to solve the 
resolution problem. 
Preliminary Control by Governing Body Officers 
Prior to 1922 there were no spécifie provisions in the Standing Orders 
regarding resolutions. Amendments to the Standing Orders were made in 
1922 and 1930 establishing the basic framework for committee examination 
of resolutions submitted to the Conférence. 
The first hint that preliminary control might be necessary came in a 
report by the 1939 Committee on Standing Orders. Noting that the rules as 
they stood required that "any résolutions" deposited in accordance with the 
rules: 
ha(d) to be distributed to the delegates automatically, ... the question which the 
Governing Body (and the Committee) had to consider was whether it would not be 
désirable to provide some preliminary control over resolutions. 
The Governing Body came to the conclusion that some such control was required 
and that it could best be exercised by submitting the resolutions to the Officers of the 
Governing Body before the opening of the Conférence and by providing that they 
should be published and distributed to the Conférence unless the officers of the 
Governing Body decided unanimously to the contrary. This would give a Guarantee 
that the wishes of one group could not be overruled by the other two groups48. 
This is the origin of Article 17, Paragraph 1, sections (2) and (3), giving the 
Director-General power to withhold circulation of resolutions with the 
unanimous support of the Officers of the Governing Body. 
Unfortunately, the Committee Report does not outline the origin of 
concern over the need for parliamentary control49. One may hypothesize 
48 C P 1939:408. 
49 The original suggestion that preliminary control should be exercised was offered by 
the Swiss government delegate at the 1938 Conférence (CP 1938:435). The 1938 Standing 
Orders Commit tee of the Conférence could not corne to a décision on first inspection of the 
proposai ; they referred it to the Governing Body. The quest ion was discussed by the Standing 
Orders Commit tee of the Governing Body and then by the Commit tee on Standing Orders of 
the 1939 Conférence (CP 1939:250). The proposai was adopted wi thout comment (CP 
1939:250). The Report of the 1939 Commit tee on Standing Orders does not provide the debate 
on the proposa i . Finally, the debate of the Governing Body 's Standing Orders Commit tee of 
February 1939 is not provided in the text. The motivat ion of Mr . Renggli 's (the Swiss delegate) 
proposai is not demonst ra ted (Governing Body Minutes , February 1939:104). The Repor t of 
the Commit tee does not ment ion political resolutions: it does ment ion concern over the final 
decision-making author i ty regarding restraint of resolutions and the impact of that process on 
the tr iparti te groups . 
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from the limited record of debate in the Conférence and Governing Body 
that the concern was not based on a fear that the resolution procédure was 
becoming politicized. Fairness to the tripartite groups was important in the 
minds of the 1939 Governing Body delegates50, interest groups rather than 
géographie or political affiliation still served as the dividing mechanism be-
tween Conférence participants. The increasingly tense political period of the 
late 1930's may hâve contributed to the amendment's acceptance. 
Because the rule lacks spécifie criteria upon which a détermination of 
irreceivability may be made, the Director-General and Officers of the 
Governing Body hâve never made use of it. Instead of creating a "common 
law of resolutions", Office and Governing Body leadership hâve chosen to 
leave restraint to the discrétion of Conférence participants. While this 
policy avoids the possibility of censure of the Director-General or calls of 
unfair exercise of authority by affected delegates and governments, its inef-
fectiveness has become apparent. 
Article 17(7) — Control by the Resolutions Committee 
In 1959 the Resolutions Committee was given greater authority to 
détermine the receivability of resolutions. An early criticism of the political 
use of resolutions was made in the 1957 Office report concerning the work-
ings of the Organization51. In the past, the Resolutions Committee had had 
the power to find the adoption of a resolution inexpedient or the Confér-
ence incompétent to handle the resolution. However, 
... (b)efore concluding that the Conférence is not compétent, or that the adoption of 
a resolution is inexpedient, the Resolutions Committee necessarily consider(ed), to a 
greater or lesser extent, the substance of the resolution; the conclusion reached by 
the Committee is subject to debate by the Conférence and such debate may be as well 
as that concerning a resolution reported favourably by the Committee52. 
By making the Committee décision on receivability non-debatable in 
the plenary, the 1959 Conférence hoped to close the gap that had developed 
in the efficacy of the old rule. The 1959 amendment is today embodied in 
Article 17(7) of the Standing Orders. 
Article 17(7) gives the Resolutions Committee the power to block a 
resolution. Thèse rules hâve been used on only four occasions: during the 
1959 and 1960 Conférence. In each instance the resolution was probably 
50 International Labor Organization, Minutes ofthe 86th Session ofthe Governing Body 
of the International Labor Organization, Geneva, ILO, 1939, p. 104. Henceforth referred to as 
GB 1939, 86th Session: 104 (Governing Body Minutes, year, session, page). 
si GB 1957, 137th Session: 138-139. 
52 ibid., p. 139. 
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suppressed by a Western voting alliance53. During the past 20 years, how-
ever, Article 17(7) has not been used, certainly not for want of disfunctional 
resolutions but rather because of the inability to muster the necessary votes 
in Committee. 
Preliminary Control Through Priority Setting 
The final complément to the array of preliminary control rules was 
recommended to the 1963 Conférence by the Ago Committee, the 1962 
Working Party on Standing Rules. Under the proposed amendment, a bal-
lot would be taken by the Resolutions Committee to détermine the priority 
of the first five draft resolutions; a Working Party comprised of three repré-
sentatives of each group would then rank the remaining draft resolutions. 
Despite opposition from Eastern European members, the amendment was 
adopted at the 1963 Conférence, becoming Article 17(5) of the Standing 
Orders. 
The Ago rule is difficult to explain as a device for the control of politi-
cal resolutions. While at the time of its adoption the 1963 rule may, justi-
fiably, hâve been seen as a means of expediting the work of the Resolutions 
Committee during the Conférence, it has had the effect of establishing a de 
facto limit of five resolutions to be acted upon by the Conférence. How-
ever, since 1963 voting patterns hâve changed drastically in the Organiza-
tion, making it possible for controversial resolutions to find their way to the 
top of the priority list. Once controversial resolutions are given priority 
amongst the top five resolutions, polemic debate in both the Resolutions 
Committee and the plenary has bogged down considération of resolutions 
lower on the priority list. In sum, the rule has failed as a restraint procédure 
and only slightly succeeded as a means of expediting Conférence review of 
resolutions. 
53 It is impossible to definitely détermine which groups or alliances voted for or against 
thèse proposais as they were not recorded votes; nor were there speakers for and against the 
quashing motions named in the record. However, a look at the nature of the quashed resolu-
tions is revealing. 
In 1959, 17(7) was used on three resolutions, two concerning the réduction of unemploy-
ment through the élimination of barriers to international trade, submitted by East European 
délégations, and one concerning the prohibition of undesirable movements of population and 
workers submitted by the government delegates from the United Arab Republic (CP 1959: 
640-643). Thèse resolutions were moved inexpedient on motions proposed by an Italian and a 
Canadian delegate respectively (CP 1959:641-642). 
In 1960, 17(7) was applied to a resolution submitted by the Polish and Bulgarian workers 
delegates concerning the activities of the ILO on behalf of économie and social progress facili-
tated by disarmament (CP 1960:685-587). 
None of thèse resolutions involve the direct condemnation of a member state; rather they 
fall into Category II, non-germane resolutions. 
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Landelius noted an interesting phenomena after the first application of 
the Ago rule at the 1964 Conférence54. Considering the content of the reso-
lutions as priority ranked by the Committee vote and the décisions of the 
Committee's Working Party, Landelius concluded that resolutions ranked 
in the upper five positions were not "of interest to the East European dele-
gates." However, the resolution ranked seventh, submitted by the USSR 
government delegate concerning the program and structure of the ILO, was 
of interest. After examining the debate in the Resolutions Committee, 
Landelius believed that: 
... the Eastern European représentatives were thus obliged to wait until the Commit-
tee had considered six resolutions of no concern to them. Certainly they could hâve 
participated in the discussion on the first six resolutions and presented amendments. 
But this would hâve prolonged the délibérations, creating a risk that their own pro-
posais would not be considered. This situation led to an unusual state of affairs in 
comparison with earlier sessions. Aside from some cross remarks regarding the 
results of the ballot, there was hardly any East European participation during a week 
and a half55. 
After the Committee considered the Soviet resolution the "discussion as-
sumed the (verbose) character it had at the preceding sessions." Ultimately, 
this resolution, ranked seventh, was adopted by the Conférence. 
Table C shows that in several years between 1964 and 1970 when reso-
lutions of political interest to Eastern European countries were not priority 
ranked among the top five resolutions, the plenary found time to act upon 
more than five resolutions. Taking Landelius' observation one step further, 
one may hypothesize that when the Eastern Bloc was unable to vote resolu-
tions "of interest" into the top five positions, expeditious debcite allowed 
the plenary to take action on them. 
As the voting power of the Group of 77 and the Eastern European Bloc 
became Consolidated, particularly since 1970, resolutions of interest to 
those groups could be ranked in the top five through the established voting 
procédure. Consequently, prior to the 1980 assemblage the Conférence had 
not acted upon six, seven, eight, or nine resolutions, like in the years 1965, 
1966, 1967, and 1964 respectively. In light of this clear trend and the 1980 
54 LANDELIUS, op. cit., pp. 190-191. 
55 Ibid. 
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Conférence Record, discussion of six resolutions at the 1979 Conférence 
was extraordinary — not indicative of a change in the trend56. 
Note also that in a significant number of years between 1970 and 1980 
less than five resolutions were considered by the plenary. In each year a 
political resolution can be cited as the cause of the backlog: in 1973 it was 
the anti-Israël resolution; in 1975 the problem was the Chilean resolution; in 
1977 a resolution aimed at strengthening tripartism caused by controversy; 
in 1978 another anti-Israël resolution held up considération of other resolu-
tions; and in 1980 another anti-Israël resolution created a disruption. 
The 1980 Labor Conférence provides a startlingly obvious view of the 
use of priority setting by Conférence political interest groups. For the first 
time, the Resolutions Committee issued a majority and minority ranking of 
those resolutions given priority below the top five. A review of Table D, 
noting the title of the resolution, its content, sponsorship, and ranking 
shows that the minority report gave higher priority to resolutions whose 
content boarder on the fringes of ILO responsibility. The continued shift in 
voting power accounts first, for the mère occurrence of a minority report at 
the 1980 Resolutions Committee, and second, for the adoption of the anti-
Israël resolution in the plenary57. 
This brief examination of the rule promoted by the Ago Committee 
dramatically illustrâtes the fact that rules adopted to afford the opportunity 
for preliminary control of resolutions are relies of the days of Western 
power in the ILO. Along with the Conférence rules for establishing a quo-
rum58, the Standing Orders hâve not provided a means of stopping the polit-
ical manipulation of the Organization. 
56 The Chairman of the 1979 Resolutions Committee aptly noted that that year's Com-
mittee achieved results, the likes of which hâve not been "witnessed for very many years." 
(CP/PR 1979, 43:23-24). The Committee failed to pass a condemnatory resolution on to the 
plenary (CP/PR 1979, 43:20) and sent five functional resolutions to the Organization's mem-
bership for considération. Ail were adopted. (CP/PR 1979, 43:23-24). However, this record 
must be looked at in light of other factors: the continuing effort among several ILO members 
to rectify problems which led to the withdrawal of the United States from the Organization, 
and the on going negotiation of proposais relating to structural reform of the Organization. 
Thèse two activities may hâve contributed to the decrease in controversy during the 1979 Con-
férence. One may speculate as to the influence of thèse two factors. 
57 CP/PR 1980, 39:2. 
58 The rule requires that the sum of the votes for and against a resolution be equal to at 
least a majority of the delegates officially registered at the Conférence. If this number is not 
obtained the resolution is defeated for lack of a quorum. This has been problematic because 
délégations hâve abstained from voting on a resolution rather than casting a négative vote, 
resulting in the resolution's defeat for lack of quorum. See also CP/PR 1980, 43:20. 
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ATTEMPTS AT CONTROL THROUGH STRUCTURAL REFORM 
Since 1964, the Organization has shifted the forum for discussion of 
resolution procédure modification from the Standing Orders Committee to 
Committees on Structure. Ironically, it has been through the 1964 resolu-
tion calling for structural reform of the ILO that the most récent attempts at 
amendment of the resolution procédure has been sought59. 
Efforts in 1967 
The aim of the 1963 Ago Amendment not having been realized, further 
proposais were presented in 1967 to curb the use of political resolutions and 
to expedite functional resolutions. However, thèse amendments, aimed at 
revamping the priority setting procédure through subcommittee work and 
reinforcing the Director-General's preliminary control authority, did not 
address the shifting power in the Organization which made possible the in-
creasing prevalence and annoyance of political resolutions. 
In 1967, the Governing Body's Working Party on Structure dealt with 
two proposais aimed at improving the workings of the resolutions procé-
dure so as to "reduce the danger that resolutions in which there is considér-
able interest... may not be considered for lack of time."60The first proposai 
asked that the Director-General initiate discussions between sponsors of 
similar resolutions with a view toward consolidation of texts. The second 
suggested that the Resolutions Committee create a subcommittee to review 
noncontroversial resolutions with a view to the submission of widely agreed 
upon texts to the full Committee. Upon considération, the Working Party 
felt that procédures already existed within the Organization to make the 
changes suggested by the proposais. Hence, no amendment of Article. 17 
was recommended to the General Conférence. 
59 The 1964 Conférence adopted a resolution calling on the Director-General to develop 
a report and analysis of questions of the Organizat ion 's s tructure. In the resolution, Mr. 
Borisov, government delegate from the Soviet Union, asked that the Governing Body consider 
proposais for change of the program and structure of the ILO (CP 1964:817). Borisov's origi-
nal text asked that a committee of the General Conférence be established to consider spécifie 
proposais submitted to the 47th and 48th Sessions of the Conférence (CP 1964:600). The 
reform called for by the Soviet delegate was aimed at making the Organizat ion more responsive 
to the Socialist and Third World countries — an objective pursued by the Group of 77 in ail the 
U N family organizat ions. Work toward structural reform began in November 1964 and con-
tinues today . 
60 Report ofthe Director-General, Supplément, Fourth Report ofthe Working Party of 
the Governing Body of the International Labor Office on the Program and Structure of the 
ILO, Geneva, ILO, 1968, p . 9. 
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The Working Party also considered an amendment proposed by the 
Director-General. The proposai would hâve reinforced the authority given 
the Director-General in Article 17(2 and 3) by sanctioning his withholding 
of resolutions submitted to the General Conférence which were not express-
ed in "parliamentary language". Exactly what was meant by the phrase 
"parliamentary language" is unclear. However, the Working Party con-
cluded that the Director-General was authorized by the existing language of 
Article 17 to withhold such resolutions from the Conférence. For the first 
time since the création of Article 17(2 and 3) some substance was given to 
the Director-General's authority. 
In declining the Director-General's request for inclusion of the "parlia-
mentary language" rule in Article 17, the Working Party did express its 
opinion that resolutions not phrased in "parliamentary language" are but 
"one type" of resolution with respect to which the Director-General's 
authority may be applied61. The Working Party did not expound on other 
types of resolutions warranting exercise of the Director-General's authority. 
Since 1974: Toward the "Committee of Seven" Solution 
Between 1968 and 1977 no meaningful discussion of the resolution pro-
cédure took place in the various committees on structure62. In the 1977 Gen-
eral Conférence Committee on Structure, the question of resolutions was 
discussed thoroughly — in terms of the mission of the Organization and the 
increasing occurrence of resolutions irrelevant to the legitimate work of the 
Organization. With the expérience of several condemnatory resolutions still 
fresh, particularly the anti-Israeli resolutions, the approach taken by the 
Committee resulted in the question: Accepting that certain resolutions 
should be excluded from the purview of the ILO, how would such a déter-
mination be made?63 
The différence between this approach to the problem and others taken 
during previous discussions is seen in the report of the 1977 Committee. For 
6i GB 1965, 163rd Session: 83. 
62 Al though in 1970 a proposai was made to the Conférence Commit tee on Structure 
asking that the entire priority order of resolutions be determined by a vote, no consensus was 
reached in discussions of this amendment and nothing became of it. 
In 1969 an item concerning the p rogram and structure of the I L O was placed on the agen-
da . After several committee sessions, the 1971 Conférence suspended discussion of ail struc-
tural issues, including the resolutions procédure , until the 1973 General Conférence. During 
the intervening year " in fo rmai discussions" were to take place amongs t and between the 
various groups , looking ultimately for a breakdown in the impasse. After the resumption of 
formai discussion it was not until the 1977 General Conférence that the resolutions issue was 
discussed again. 
63 CP 1977:751. 
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the first time, the Committee members accepted the fact that the ILO is a 
specialized UN Organization and that certain resolutions are outside of the 
Organization's scope of authority. They also accepted the idea that the con-
demnation of a member state should only follow an investigation of accusa-
tions64. In light of the acceptance of thèse principles and despite the Com-
mittee's inability to reach consensus on actual amendments, the plenary ex-
tended that mandate of the Working Party for another year and asked that 
a report be made to the 1978 Conférence. 
While major différences continued with regard to other proposed 
structural changes, the récognition of guiding principles for the amendment 
of Article 17 was a major step forward. It not only represented movement 
after several years of standstill in the Committee but also the beginnings of 
the tactical realignment of the Group of 77 and the Soviet bloc. For the first 
time, the Soviet bloc as well as the Group of 77 emphasized that amendment 
of the resolutions procédure was only part of the larger structural reform of 
the ILO65. Compromise bargaining would be facilitated by linking the indi-
vidual questions of structural reform. An analysis of the final group of 
amendments to émerge from the Committee shows that this "packaging" 
of proposais has contributed to the strength of the Soviet and Group of 77 
position. 
To date a final package of amendments has not been ratified by the 
plenary. However, remarkable progress toward structural reform was made 
in the 1978 Conférence. Some consensus was reached on the question of 
resolutions procédure66. Under the résultant proposai, a compromise be-
tween IMEC and the Group of 77, the Director-General is given power to 
withhold circulation of resolutions "of a condemnatory nature against a 
member state." A Committee of Seven, comprised of the Officers of the 
Conférence as well as one représentative each from the worker, employer, 
and government groups, is given ultimate authority to withhold such resolu-
tions from the Conférence. The Committee of Seven must détermine if the 
resolution "condemns a member state on grounds which are not based on 
the conclusions of an examination of the matter in accordance with an es-
tablished ILO procédure." Upon such a finding the resolution need not be 
circulated. However, the Committee may, by a majority of at least five 
members, circulate such a condemnatory resolution in cases of "extrême 
64 C P 1977:752. 
65 CP 1977:750-759. 
66 Between October 1977 and June 1978 the I M E C countries and the G r o u p of 77 were 
able to reconcile différences on spécifie proposais of the amendment of Article 17. The re-
sulting proposai focuses on the receivability of resolutions condemning a member state. See 
CP/PR 1978, 2:22. 
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urgency or where the procédures already under way demonstrate that no 
concrète resuit can any longer be counted on the part of the state 
concerned."67 
As consensus was finally announced on the terms of the compromise, 
the USSR government delegate to the Working Party on Structure an-
nounced, on behalf of the socialist countries, that they would abstain from 
discussion of ail questions of structure as long as no solution had been 
agreed upon in relation to Article 7, composition of the non-government 
groups68. Several socialist delegates voiced their disapproval of the 1978 
compromise, calling it undemocratic and contrary to the Constitution of the 
Organization69. 
As a resuit, the Government delegate from the USSR proposed a new 
amendment to Article 17 at the November 1979 meeting of the Working 
Party on Structure70. Two concerns were addressed by the proposai: that ac-
cording priority to only five resolutions deprived delegates of the oppor-
tunity of having their draft resolution considered by the entire Conférence 
and that receivability of condemnatory resolutions should be determined 
democratically — in the plenary71. 
Limited support for the proposai arose in the Working Party. Members 
believed that allowing the full Resolutions Committee to accord priority to 
ail draft resolutions would not significantly assist in the Work of the Com-
mittee, especially considering the success of the 1979 Conférence in adop-
ting six resolutions. It was generally felt that the Conférence should not 
entertain in any way resolutions which condemned a member state; authori-
ty to détermine receivability would best be placed in spécial committee72. 
At the end of the 1980 Conférence, amendment of Article 17 was one 
of two questions left to be settled by the Committee, hence, a final compro-
mise proposai for ILO structural reform could not be made at the 1980 
Conférence. The mandate of the Committee on Structure was extended for 
another year in hopes of reaching agreement on a final package of amend-
ments acceptable to ail73. 
67 CP/PR 1978, 2:28. A final compromise on the IMEC/Group of 77 proposai, regar-
ding a time limit of 24 months for Office investigation of condemnable activities was reached 
at the 1980 Conférence. See CP/PR 1980, 4:1. 
68 CP/PR 1978, 2:36. 
69 C P / P R 1978, 33:25. 
70 CP/PR 1980, 4:4. 
71 CP/PR 1980, 4:4. 
72 See discussion of Working Par ty on Structure, C P / P R 1980, 4:5-7; Commit tee on 
Structure, C P / P R 1980, 40:5-8; as well as plenary discussion, C P / P R 1980, 40:5-8. 
73 CP/PR 1980, 44:9. 
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The Amended Resolutions Procédure 
The failure of attempts to amend or exercise the controls embodied in 
the current resolution procédure results from the changes taking place in the 
ILO since 1964. Generally, members of the Organization hâve not been able 
to décide what new type of restraint ought to be made available, to whom, 
and under what circumstances. Specifically, the increasing number of Third 
World délégations along with various blocking techniques exercised by 
Eastern European délégations hâve foreclosed the possibility of quick 
development and adoption of control rules by the Western industrialized 
countries. The amendment of Article 17, as proposed to the 1978 Confér-
ence has much to be desired in terms of the objective of restraining political 
resolutions. 
The restrictions provided in the 1978 amendment are limited. The pro-
posai addresses condemnatory resolutions to the disregard of the other 
forms of political resolutions. In light of the timing of the proposai, it seems 
probable that its formulation reflects a concern to avoid resolutions like 
that concerning Israël in 1974. Unless existing rules of control are applied 
more liberally, the way remains clear for other types of politically motivated 
resolutions to disrupt the Conférence. There is little reason to believe that 
there will be a turnabout in the past neglect of preliminary control rules. 
Furthermore, the amendment may hâve the effect of finally outlining 
the condition under which the Director-General may exercise authority 
already established for him in Paragraph 1(2), Article 17 of the Standing 
Rules. The 1967 statement of the Working Party of the Governing Body 
specifying "one type" of resolution that may rightly be withheld by the 
Director-General may go to naught in light of an additional provision out-
lining a procédure for restraining condemnatory resolutions; the 1978 
amendment may effectively eliminate any prospect for the Director-
General's exploration of existing authority. 
Lastly, the compromise reached in the 1978 proposai must be consid-
ered in light of the total structural reform package to be presented by the 
Committee on Structure at the 1981 General Conférence. A review of the 
proposais as they stand shows that the IMEC group has made concessions 
every issue pertinent to structural reform, with the exception of the resolu-
tions procédure — and even hère compromise was accepted74. It is possible 
that in searching for some remédiai action to correct the problems specified 
in the Kissinger letter of 197575, the IMEC group focused their efforts upon 
74 CP/PR 1978, 2. See also CP/PR 1980, 44. 
75 This letter was the officiai notice of the United States' intention to withdraw from the 
ILO. 
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"winning" one highly recognizable prize for the United States — amend-
aient of the resolution procédure that had irritated American involvement 
in the past. 
CONCLUSION 
Since 1964 the political resolution has posed increasing difficulty to the 
Constitutional responsibilities of the ILO. Political resolutions that were 
once disregarded or restrained before being seriously considered by the In-
ternational Labor Conférence are increasingly being found amongst those 
deemed most pressing by members of the Organization. While controversy 
has not given way to consensus over the propriety of thèse resolutions, the 
growing power of the Group of 77 and the Socialist Bloc in the Organiza-
tion has made possible the increased présence of political resolutions. Fur-
thermore, thèse powers hâve blocked attempts at procédural change and the 
application of existing procédures to check controversial political resolu-
tions. 
Central to the problem of political resolutions is a declining récognition 
and acceptance of the ILO's function as a specialized UN Organization. 
Despite déclarations to the contrary, differing views exist among member 
state as to the rôle of the Organization: controversy over the receivability of 
resolutions has become an index of the differing understandings of the 
Organization's purpose. Acceptance of the Constitution of the Organiza-
tion, implicit in membership in the Organization, no longer means leaving 
behind certain foreign policy objectives of national interest. The resuit has 
been the expression of national interests in an instrument once reserved for 
concerns which the Organization considered of specialized international in-
terest. 
The exercise of rules has, on occasion in the past, helped the Organiza-
tion avoid the disruptive impact of political resolutions. However, rules 
seem to be losing their effectiveness in detering political resolutions. 
Perhaps a change in this situation will corne with the structural modifi-
cations resulting in a future International Labor Conférence. Although it is 
highly improbable, perhaps political resolutions will lose their undesirabili-
ty as a resuit of radical structural reformation of the Organization. If this is 
the case, the Organization will lose its specialized character and become yet 
another meeting place for nations squabbling over their international politi-
cal difficulties. 
The International Labor Organization, may however, take a turn 
toward modération, without the assistance of additional rules. If the ILO's 
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technical assistance programs and other specialized activities become inter-
rupted by growing politicization, perhaps nations will moderate their jabs at 
political foes and get on with the business of the Organization. However, 
this too is an unlikely prognosis for with the return of the United States in 
1980, the Organization's budget has been replenished; budget cuts no longer 
threaten important programs. 
The rejection of the 1978 anti-Israël resolution and the functional use 
of the resolution procédure at the 1979 Conférence may be a sign of a new 
trend away from politics, rather than a fleeting response to Western disap-
proval — symbolized by the withdrawal of the United States from the 
Organization. However, the return and success of the anti-Israël resolution 
at the 1980 Conférence points toward a différent conclusion: political reso-
lutions will remain, their disruptive influence dissipating only after they 
become an expected présence at the annual Conférence. 
Whatever the future course of the ILO, resolutions will no doubt re-
flect the gênerai movement of the Organization; for this reason resolutions 
ought to be carefully watched and thoughfully considered by concerned 
commentators. 
TABLE A 
Number of Resolutions in Each Category Adopted by the 
International Labor Conférence 
1964 — 1980 
YEAR Functional Non-Germane Condemnatory Structural TOTAL 
1964 5 1 0 1 1 
1965 5 0 1 0 6 
1966 6 0 0 0 6 
1967 4 1 1 0 6 
1968 4 1 0 0 5 
1969 0 0 1 0 1 
1970 5 0 0 0 5 
1971 3 0 1 1 5 
1972 4 0 1 0 5 
1973 0 0 0 0 0 
1974 3 0 2 0 5 
1975 0 0 0 0 0 
1976 WORLD EMPLOYMENT CONFERENCE 
1977 2 0 0 0 2 
1978 2 0 0 0 2 
1979 5 0 0 0 5 
1980 2 0 1 0 3 
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TABLE B 
Origins of AH Resolutions Submitted to the International Labor Conférence 








ORIGIN: E W T E W T E W T E W T 
1964 1 3 6 — — — — — 1 3 2 4 
1965 1 2 2 1 — — 1 — 1 1 — — 
1966 3 7 1 
1967 — 6 1 1 — — 1 — 1 — — 1 
1968 1 5 3 — — — 2 3 — — 1 — 
1969 
1970 — 6 2 — — 1 1 3 — — 1 — 
1971 1 7 3 — — 1 2 3 1 — 2 1 
1972 2 14 2 — 2 — 4 4 — — 2 — 
1973 7 12 1 1 — 1 — — 1 1 — — 
1974 3 9 4 — — 4 2 1 2 — — — 
1975 4 11 3 — — — 2 1 — — — — 
1976 2 — 
1977 4 5 1 3 1 — — — 1 — — — 
1978 2 9 2 1 2 — — — 1 — — — 
1979 1 6 5 1 — 1 — — 1 — — — 
1980 3 10 1 1 — — — — 2 — — — 
E — Eastern European W -- Western Bloc T - - Third World 
Inclusive of ail resolutions listed as "communicated to the Conférence" in the Record of 
Conférence Proceedings. Committee and plenary action is not reflected. Withdrawal of resolu-
tions and combination of similar resolutions is not reflected. Where a resolution was co-
sponsored by a mix of Eastern, Western, and Third World countries, the affiliation of the ma-
jority is shown. Where the majority cannot be determined, the Western or Eastern affiliation is 
counted, not the Third World. 
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a b 





Ranking of Resolutions Sponsored by the Eastern Bloc 





16 X X 
15 X 
14 X 
13 X X 
12 X X 
11 X X 
10 
9 5? X 
8 X ^ X X 
7 X X X 9 X X X 
6 9 ^ X X X ^ 
5 X ^ 
4 
3 X X X X ^ ^ 
2 
1 9 






9 X X X 
X — Resolution sponsored by a majority of Eastern Bloc Delegates; does not include 
resolutions that were combined with other resolutions. 
^""Xcap) — Indicates the total number of resolutions considered in the plenary, not necessarily 
adopted. For example, 9 resolutions were considered in 1964, 5 resolutions in 
1971, and 2 resolutions in 1977. 
a — No resolutions were considered by the 1975 Conférence. 
b — The World Employment Conférence was held in 1976. 
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TABLE D 
Majority and Minority Ranking of Resolutions Submitted to the 1980 Conférence 
Resolution Concerning: 
Israeli Settlements in Palestine 
Assistance to Zimbabwa 
ILO Activities for Rural Development 
Training of Managers in Developing Countries 
Training 
Women's Participation in ILO Activities 
ILO Action on Behalf of Migrant Workers 
Implementation of Full Employment Policies 
and Guarantee of the Right to Work 
ILO Activities for Elimination of Child Labor 
Alcohol and Drug Dependency at Workplace 
Protection of Employée Inventors' Rights 
Régime of Employment Stability in Panama 
Duty-Free Export Zones 
Réduction of Normal Hours of Work 
Transnational Corporations, Social Policy and 
ILO Action Concerning the New International 
Economie Order 
Economie and Social Conséquences of 
Disarmament 
Violation of Trade Union and Human Rights 







T 1 1 
W 2 2 
W 3 3 
W 4 4 
W 5 5 
W 6 6 
E 7 9 
E 8 7 
W 9 17 
W 10 16 
W 11 15 
T 12 12 
W 13 14 
W 14 13 
E 15 10 
E 16 8 
17 11 
Les résolutions de caractère politique 
à la Conférence internationale du travail 
L'Organisation internationale du travail est un groupement spécialisé des 
Nations unies chargée d'améliorer les conditions de travail dans le monde. Chaque 
année, l'Organisation convoque une Conférence internationale du travail pour met-
tre au point des normes de travail, autoriser l'établissement des programmes d'aide 
technique et orienter d'une façon générale les travaux de recherche et d'éducation du 
secrétariat de l'Organisation, le Bureau international du travail. De plus, les déléga-
tions nationales des États membres, composées de représentants des gouvernements, 
des employeurs et des travailleurs, présentent et adoptent des résolutions portant sur 
des sujets d'intérêt spécial pour les membres. 
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De plus en plus, depuis 1964, le thème de ces résolutions a été détourné des ques-
tions traitant des politiques du travail pour l'étude desquelles l'Organisation était 
mandatée de par ses statuts vers des débats se rapportant aux problèmes de politique 
internationale. Résultat: le temps et l'énergie de l'Organisation se trouvent ainsi en-
traînés vers l'examen de sujets qui relèvent de la compétence des organismes politi-
ques des Nations unies. En outre, l'utilisation de l'Organisation pour promouvoir 
des sujets controversés a miné la confiance des certains États membres dans l'effica-
cité de l'Organisation. 
Cet article fait ressortir la difficulté de définir ce que l'on peut considérer com-
me une résolution de caractère politique, analyse l'utilisation de plus en plus fré-
quente des résolutions de caractère politique au sein de l'Organisation et étudie les 
divers moyens d'en réduire le nombre et d'en minimiser l'influence nuisible. 
La question de la politisation: la politisation des organisations internationales 
spécialisées se produit lorsque les mécanismes fonctionnels de l'Organisation, en 
l'occurrence, les résolutions du Bureau international du travail, sont utilisés à des 
fins étrangères à la compétence même de l'Organisation, ce qui entraîne une distor-
tion des mécanismes et des controverses au sein de l'assemblée elle-même. Depuis 
1964, les membres du BIT ont fortement différé d'opinion au sujet du rôle propre de 
l'Organisation. En conséquence, les résolutions ont de plus en plus porté sur des su-
jets étrangers à la compétence traditionnelle de l'Organisation. Bien qu'il y ait eu des 
résolutions de caractère politique depuis l'origine même du BIT, ce n'est que depuis 
la décennie 1960 que ces résolutions ont eu une influence sur le travail traditionnel de 
l'Organisation. La raison en est que le bloc oriental et le tiers-monde en sont venus à 
dominer numériquement l'Organisation et ainsi à se trouver en mesure de soulever, 
par le mécanisme des résolutions, des questions qui n'étaient pas du ressort du BIT. 
La difficulté de définir les résolutions «politiques» est atténuée lorsqu'on les 
classifie selon certains critères, soit la controverse créée par la résolution, les groupes 
qui appuient une résolution ou s'y opposent ou le langage même de la résolution. Ce 
sont là les indices principaux qui permettent de considérer si une résolution donnée 
revêt un caractère politique. On retrouve quatre types ou catégories de résolutions à 
la Conférence internationale du travail: des résolutions qui se rapportent à l'activité 
de l'Organisation, dites résolutions fonctionnelles, des résolutions qui ne relèvent 
pas de la responsabilité de l'Organisation, des résolutions de blâme et des résolutions 
qui touchent la structure même de l'Organisation. Bien que l'on puisse déceler la pré-
sence d'énoncés politiques dans l'un ou l'autre de ces types de résolutions, les décla-
rations politiques sont surtout inhérentes aux résolutions de blâme. 
Les tendances depuis 1964: le nombre des résolutions fonctionnelles, tout com-
me le nombre total des résolutions adoptées chaque année, a décliné d'une façon 
générale depuis 1964 comme le montre le tableau A. Cependant, une comparaison du 
tableau A et du tableau B indique que le nombre des résolutions qui ne se rapportent 
pas à l'activité propre de la Conférence n'empêche pas nécessairement l'examen des 
résolutions qui s'y rapportent. 
Les résolutions de blâme sont celles qui ont soulevé le plus de difficultés parce 
qu'elles fournissent l'occasion aux États membres de marquer des gains politiques en 
portant des accusations embarrassantes contre d'autres États pour des infractions 
qui semblent être de la compétence du BIT. D'autres facteurs doivent être aussi con-
sidérés pour déterminer si les résolutions de blâme sont vraiment présentées à des fins 
politiques. Les récentes conférences confirment cette expérience. 
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Contrôles et restrictions 
Au BIT, on a eu recours à plusieurs méthodes pour limiter les distorsions engen-
drées par des résolutions à saveur politique. Bien que le Conseil d'administration et 
le directeur général aient le pouvoir de retrancher de l'ordre du jour des résolutions, 
ils n'ont jamais exercé cette autorité. Par la suite, dans un effort en vue de rendre 
plus démocratique le processus de contrôle, l'on a tenté de donner l'autorité en cette 
matière au Comité des résolutions. Mais, comme le pouvoir des groupes non-
occidentaux s'accroissait, les contrôles sont devenus inadéquats. Le fractionnement 
ultérieur des groupes de pression au sein de l'Organisation est responsable d'une dis-
torsion encore plus grande soulevée par la présentation et, avec une fréquence accen-
tuée, l'adoption de résolutions de caractère politique. Plus récemment, des tentatives 
en vue d'en arriver à une réforme des structures du BIT comprenaient des proposi-
tions destinées à favoriser la modification de la procédure des résolutions. Jusqu'à 
aujourd'hui, on n'a pas réussi à mettre au point un compromis acceptable quant à 
un ensemble global de réformes des structures. 
Conclusion: Le problème des résolutions politiques est au coeur du déclin de la 
reconnaissance et de l'acceptation du rôle du BIT en tant qu'agence spécialisée des 
Nations unies. Les mutations survenues dans la structure du pouvoir depuis 1964 au 
sein de l'Organisation ont rendu possible l'augmentation des résolutions de caractère 
politique. De plus, les contrôles statutaires n'ont pas réussi à limiter les pertes de 
temps et l'adultération des principaux contenus dans les statuts. En conséquence, les 
résolutions de caractère politique, non seulement sont devenues un moyen de plus en 
plus utilisé dans les débats ordinaires de l'Organisation, mais elles sont aussi un ins-
trument de politisation. 
